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Comments 
and Discussion 
Gary Hufbauer: Neomercantilists  are gaining new ground  with each 
month's trade figures, each commercial  dispute with Japan, and each 
newly revealed  flaw  in the economic spectacle known as Reaganomics. 
In the face of the neomercantilist  attack, the papers delivered at this 
symposium  make a reasoned and valiant  effort to defend the ramparts 
of a liberal  economic system. 
Make no mistake. The ramparts  are under attack. Watch the news- 
paper  headlines  and  the magazine  cover stories: "Free Trade  Losing Its 
Supporters-Large U.S.  Debts Strengthening  Drive for Protectionist 
Legislation" (Washington  Post,  May 3,  1987); "Can America Com- 
pete?" (Business Week,  April  20, 1987).  And watch the names that  grab 
the limelight  on trade  questions:  Richard  Gephardt,  Lee laccoca, Robert 
Reich, and Lester Thurow. 
Neomercantilists  have  even breached  the  walls  of the  citadel.  Contrast 
President  Reagan's  trade  rhetoric  with  his trade  actions. Ronald  Reagan, 
the most resounding  free trade  rhetorician  since Woodrow  Wilson, has 
yielded to protectionist  pressure  in one industry  after another-sugar, 
steel, autos, lumber,  and more-in  a series of "strategic  withdrawals" 
designed  to avert  a full-scale  rout.1 
In these comments, I offer my own assessment of the trade policy 
debate, starting  with a brief review of the international  trade worries 
that have so amply  nourished  neomercantilist  thought,  then presenting 
1. Gary  Clyde  Hufbauer  and  Howard  F. Rosen, Trade  Policy  for Troubled  Industries 
(Washington,  D.C.: Institute  for International  Economics,  March  1986).  It is worth  noting 
that President  Reagan's  celebration  of temporary  "escape clause" protection  in saving 
Harley  Davidson  overlooks  the fact that  most of his trade  actions  entailed  semipermanent 
protection  with no requirement  that  the domestic  industry  adjust  to international  compe- 
tition  on a prescribed  timetable. 
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an overview of establishment  defenses, and finally  pointing  to gaps in 
the establishment's  barricades. 
Two developments  gave prominence  to neomercantilist  arguments. 
Both are  well known.  The first  is the string  of huge  U.S. current  account 
deficits: $140 billion in 1986, about the same in 1987, and apparently 
exceeding $100 billion for years to come. The inevitable corollary of 
back-to-back  current  account  deficits  is the rapid  buildup  of net external 
claims held by foreigners  on U.S. assets: the trajectory  of net external 
claims  is now pointing  toward  $1,000  billion  in the early 1990s,  about  20 
percent  of U.S. GNP. 
The second spur to the neomercantilists  is the growing  fear that the 
United States is fast becoming a second-rate  industrial  power and the 
suspicion that superior  Japanese economic statecraft  is an important 
cause of America's  relative  decline.2 
These developments  inspire  concern that much  is wrong  with Amer- 
ican economic policy. The alleged  ills include  not only profligacy  by the 
federal  government  and  individual  households,  but also national  neglect 
of worker  skills and worker  attitudes,  inadequate  civilian  research  and 
development,  low business investment,  and  corporate  strategy  hobbled 
by a fear of takeover bids. Beyond these domestic shortcomings,  the 
neomercantilists  argue  that an open trading  system has enabled  foreign 
firms  to take a free ride  on the vast U.S. market-to the disadvantage  of 
American  industry  and  workers. 
Some observers see in these developments  a watershed  in American 
economic  policy. Pat  Choate,  for  example,  divides  American  commercial 
history into three phases.3  From publication  of Alexander  Hamilton's 
Report  on Manufactures  in 1791  to Woodrow  Wilson's inauguration  in 
1913, explicit U.S. policy was to promote industrial  growth behind a 
wall of high tariffs. From  the era of Woodrow  Wilson  to that of Ronald 
Reagan, policies of free trade dovetailed with ascendant American 
economic and political power. And after Ronald  Reagan?  Choate sees 
the distinct possibility of inward-looking  policies, both diplomatic  and 
2. Among  the insignia  of relative  decline  are slower  productivity  growth  in the United 
States  than  in  Japan  (even  in  the 1980s  when  the  Japanese  economy  slowed  down);  superior 
Japanese  commercialization  of products  invented in the United States, such as color 
television,  video cassette  recorders,  and  a range  of semiconductors;  far  weaker  secondary 
and  vocational  education  systems  in the United  States  than  in Japan;  far  less  job loyalty  in 
the United  States;  and, of course, much  lower U.S. saving  and  investment  rates. 
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commercial,  with Congress  playing  a larger  role in shaping  the foreign 
policy agenda.4 
Defenders of the liberal economic order can be grouped  into three 
camps, two of which are represented  in this symposium.  The first  camp 
argues  that the neomercantilists  are doing their best to whip up public 
anxiety and that the media have played into their hands by vastly 
exaggerating  America's  problems.  In the  face of hysteria,  the right  policy 
is simply to "keep calm." Purveyors  of this advice include a range of 
economists from Arthur  Laffer  to Franco  Modigliani  to Herbert  Stein, 
who more  or less dismissed  the problem  in the Wall  Street  Journal.  The 
market, Stein argued, knows better than the government what the 
optimum  trade deficit is. Despite the deficit, U.S. total output and per 
capita output are higher  now than they were in 1982, the last time the 
United States had a trade  surplus.  All that is happening  is that interna- 
tional levels of per capita output are converging. "There must," he 
concluded, "be something  more serious  to worry  about."5 
The second establishment  camp is occupied by mainstream  macro- 
economists, ably  represented  at this symposium  by Rudiger  Dornbusch, 
and  including  such advocates  as C. Fred  Bergsten,  Alan Blinder,  Martin 
Feldstein, and Stephen Marris. Mainstreamers  insist that the huge 
current  account deficit and buildup  of net external claims is the direct 
and  foreseeable  result  of Reaganomics,  with its massive budget  deficits, 
high  real  interest  rates, and, until 1985,  a vastly overvalued  dollar. 
To be sure, mainstreamers  disagree  among  themselves as to proper 
policies  for reducing  the fiscal  deficit,  for  depreciating  the exchange  rate, 
and  for stimulating  Japan  and  Europe. But they resoundingly  agree  with 
one another  that the problem  is a macroeconomic  problem-by  defini- 
tion, a problem  within  their  peculiar  competence-and  that the damage 
visited  on the economy  by Reaganomics  can be largely  undone  by a dose 
of "anti-Reaganomics.'' 
4. Peter  F. Krogh,  Dean of the School of Foreign  Service  at Georgetown  University, 
contends  that  Congress  is no longer  providing  the financial  backing  necessary  to support 
American  foreign  policy on the scale pursued  in the 1950s  and 1960s. See Edmund  A. 
Walsh  School  of Foreign  Service, Georgetown  University,  Report  of the  Dean, 1986,  pp. 
9-10. For a more  optimistic  note on commercial  policy trends,  see Gary  Hufbauer,  "The 
Long View of Trade Policy," Harvard  International  Review, vol. 9 (February-March 
1987),  pp. 6-9. 
5. Herbert  Stein, "Leave the Trade  Deficit  Alone," Wall  Street  Journal,  March  11, 
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The third  establishment  camp-well  represented  at this symposium 
by Robert Crandall,  Robert Lawrence, Robert Litan, and Catherine 
Mann-goes  on the offensive in the debate about whether America is 
still "No.  1." These observers are not sanguine that the free flow of 
knowledge  and capital  will keep America  from  slipping  to "No. 2." But 
they argue that lagging performance  must be addressed by renewed 
emphasis  on the basics: more  civilian  research  and development,  better 
worker  skills, more  investment,  and  a balanced  budget. 
Conversely,  they  argue  that  congressional  efforts  to find  new solutions 
in the realm of trade policy or industrial  policy will at best prove 
ineffective and at worst damaging to  the  smooth workings of  the 
economic system. Robert  Crandall  points to the ineffectiveness  of steel 
protection  and  the outlandish  cost of auto protection.  Robert  Lawrence 
and  Robert  Litan  point  to errors  in the neomercantilist  lament  about  low 
wages and the neomercantilist  enthusiasm  for matching  foreign trade 
distortions  with  American  trade  distortions.  Catherine  Mann  emphasizes 
the dangers  of an "aggressive"  trade  policy posture:  with a few miscal- 
culations,  everyone can be worse off. 
A neomercantilist  would  lambast  all three  establishment  camps  as out 
of touch with the realities  of economic life and given to excessive faith 
in market  mechanisms.  I do not agree with those arguments.  But I do 
see gaps in the establishment  barricades,  and, in the spirit of friendly 
criticism,  I will point  them  out. 
Can we safely rely, as "keep calm" economists recommend, on 
markets  to regulate  the size of current  account  deficits  and  the accumu- 
lation  of net external  claims?  Alan  Blinder  tells us why not. "As Herbert 
Stein is fond of pointing  out, if something  cannot continue forever, it 
will stop. So it is with the unseemly amount  of foreign borrowing  the 
U.S. has been doing lately to finance  the trade deficit. We cannot feed 
our  voracious  borrowing  habit  at current  rates  indefinitely,  so something 
will curb  our appetite.  But there  are better  and  worse ways to stop.  6 
Recent economic history justifies skepticism that financial  market 
prices-namely,  exchange  rates, interest  rates, and  equity  valuations- 
will send correct and timely signals  to the real markets.  If the signaling 
system functioned well,  why did the world economy experience a 
6. Alan  S. Blinder,  "It's Time  to Put  an End  to the Borrowing  Binge,"  Business Week 
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devastating  recession between 1982  and 1984?  Only  with  painful  lurches 
does the financial  system accomplish  a shift  of resources  between broad 
areas of economic activity: from the government  sector to the traded 
goods sector, from expenditure  to savings, from stimulus  in the United 
States to stimulus  in Japan  and  Europe. 
The market  mechanism  works well at moving resources from con- 
struction  activity to retail  services. But it does not necessarily  deliver  a 
national  saving  rate that is consistent with national  aspirations.  And to 
accomplish smooth transitions  on an international  scale, governments 
must  pursue  active and  coordinated  policies. 
The "keep calm" defense tells America  not to worry  because the free 
flow of capital and knowledge will ensure a rough parity between the 
United States and other leading industrial  nations. According to this 
argument,  because there is a strong  tendency toward "convergence," 
the United States cannot  regain  its postwar  position  of leadership  in the 
world  economy, but it will not fall much  behind  Japan. 
The convergence  story  is contradicted  by economic history. In 1899, 
U.K. per capita  gross domestic product,  then the highest in the world, 
was twice the French level and thirteen  times the Japanese level.7 In 
1985,  the U.K. per capita  gross national  product  was only 85 percent  of 
the French level and just 71 percent of the Japanese level.8 Most 
Americans  would not regard  a U.S. per capita  income that was only 71 
percent  of the Japanese  level as "convergence." 
The convergence story is also contradicted  by common  sense. To be 
sure, a great  deal of capital  moves between nations;  but national  saving 
rates remain the foremost determinant  of national investment rates. 
Moreover, even in this era of international  technology licensing and 
multinational  corporations,  much  production  know-how  remains  highly 
specific  to particular  firms  and  particular  workplaces. 
The  first  thing  to be said  about  the  mainstream  macroeconomic  defense 
is that  it misses half the debate. Even if the mainstreamers  are right,  and 
their prescriptions  are followed, and the U.S.  current  account deficit 
7.  Alfred Maizels, Industrial Growth and World Trade: An Empirical Study of Trends 
in Production,  Consumption  and  Trade  in  Manufactures  from  1899  to  1959  with  a 
Discussion  of Probable Future Trends (Cambridge University  Press,  1963), table E2, p. 
533. 
8.  Central Intelligence  Agency,  Handbook  of  Economic  Statistics,  1986,  table  2, 
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smoothly  heads  toward  zero, does that  answer  American  concerns  about 
becoming "No. 2"? Probably not. External equilibrium  provides no 
assurance that the quality of technological innovation or the rate of 
productivity  growth  will keep America  at parity  with Japan. 
The second criticism of mainstreamers  is  that they have rigidly 
narrowed  the array of solutions. Basically, their menu contains only 
three dishes: a smaller  fiscal deficit  in the United States, further  depre- 
ciation  of the dollar,  and  rapid  growth  in Europe  and  Japan. 
By all accounts, this menu is unappealing  to those who decide such 
matters. Between 1982  and 1986, the American  body politic reached  a 
consensus that  federal  expenditures  should  remain  at about  24.5 percent 
of GNP and federal taxes should claim about 19.6 percent of GNP.9 
Higher taxes and lower spending represent a serious assault on that 
consensus. With  much  huffing  and  puffing,  the Senate now proposes to 
raise excise taxes some $18  billion  and  to cut $9 billion  from  defense and 
$9 billion from social spending.10  All this, if enacted, would trim the 
fiscal gap less than 1 percentage point. Obviously, a more vigorous 
assault on the underlying  taxation-expenditure  consensus will be re- 
quired  to shrink  the deficit  in a significant  way. 
What about more dollar depreciation  and greater stimulus  abroad? 
The Federal  Reserve, the Treasury,  and  key U.S. trading  partners  want 
no further depreciation of the dollar. And the German Minister of 
Economics, Martin  Bangemann-acting as a spokesman  for many  lead- 
ers in Europe  and  Japan-wants no more  economic stimulation. 
There  are, however, alternatives  other  than  those on the mainstream 
menu. Let me illustrate  by pointing  to alternative  ways of raising  U.S. 
domestic savings." As Alan Blinder  points out, net domestic financial 
savings can be divided into three components: net household savings 
(household  savings minus  residential  investment),  net business savings 
(business savings minus nonresidential  investment), and government 
9.  Economic Report of the President,  1987, table B-1, and table B-76. 
10. See "Senate  Clears  Fiscal '88 Budget  of $1 Trillion,"  Wall  Street  Journal,  May  7, 
1987. 
11. In a similar  vein, one could explore economic stimulation  outside the OECD, 
financed  by a major  expansion  of IMF  and  World  Bank  resources.  One  could  also explore 
systems to achieve a dual  exchange  rate (for  example,  a balance  of payments  tariff).  It is 
noteworthy  that the prominent  investor Warren  E. Buffet recently rediscovered  dual 
rates:  "How to Solve Our  Trade  Mess  without  Ruining  Our  Economy," Washington  Post, 
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Table 1.  Components of National Saving,  1978-86 
Billions of current dollars 
Year  Householda  Businessb  Governmentc  Total 
1978  -  19  11  0  -8 
1979  -21  12  12  3 
1980  14  27  -  35  6 
1981  37  -2  -30  5 
1982  49  61  -111  -1 
1983  -  22  112  -  129  -  39 
1984  -  13  26  -  102  -  89 
1985  -49  75  -  136  -  110 
1986  -  103  97  -  142  -  148 
Source: Alan  Blinder,  "It's Time  to Put an End to the Borrowing  Binge,"  Business Week  (May  4, 1987),  p. 22. 
a. Excess (deficiency)  of personal  savings  over residential  investment. 
b. Excess (deficiency)  of business  savings  (including  depreciation  allowances)  over business  investment. 
c.  Excess (deficiency)  of taxation  (federal,  state, and local)  over government  spending. 
savings (federal, state, and local taxes minus  government  expenditures 
at all levels). Allowing  for statistical  errors,  total net domestic financial 
savings  (or deficit)  must  equal  the current  account surplus  (or deficit). 
As table 1 shows, American  net household savings since 1980  have 
taken  just as big  a dive as government  savings.  This  observation  suggests 
that the current  account deficit might  be "cured" by a dramatic  fall in 
residential  investment or a dramatic  rise in personal savings. It is not 
intuitively  obvious that the harm  from compressing  household expen- 
ditures  would  exceed the  harm  from  sharply  raising  taxes or substantially 
cutting government  outlays.12 How could economic policy encourage 
larger  net household savings? Restrictions  on consumer  credit or high 
mortgage  interest  rates might  work. 
Increasing  household  savings  is not the only way to reduce  the federal 
deficit.  Another  possibility  is to increase  net business savings. It is often 
assumed  that  an increase  in net business savings must  entail  a decline in 
nonresidential  investment-bad for long-term  growth.  That  need not be 
the case. With  output  per man-hour  projected  to rise about  2.0 percent 
annually,  a policy that  restricted  annual  real  wage growth  to 1.0 percent 
12. Of course, any increase  in domestic  savings-household or government-is liable 
to cause  a recession.  In either  case, government  policy  must  manage  the shift  of resources 
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for three  years  would do wonders  for business savings.13 Indeed, such a 
policy might  well add $100 billion to business savings. Can real wage 
growth be limited in such a fashion? Conceivably a combination  of 
restrictive  monetary  policy to restrain  wage increases  and  exchange  rate 
depreciation  to raise prices of traded  goods will do the trick.  14 
Those who warn  that  trade  policy cannot  be the only answer,  perhaps 
not even the central  answer,  to those who would  keep America  "No. 1" 
are surely  right.  Common  sense says that the quality  and motivation  of 
the labor force, the amount of investment, and the inventiveness of 
research  laboratories  are  more  important  than  trade  policy. But  common 
sense does not say that  trade  policy plays an insignificant  role. 
In the first place, there is a connection between the openness of 
markets  and the extent of national  savings. Michael  Kalecki's "degree 
of monopoly"  theory  deserves a modern  revival. A closed-market  trade 
policy that  avoids marginal  cost pricing  can powerfully  protect  business 
earnings.  And such earnings  are a mainspring  of the Japanese  keiretsu 
system. 
If U.S. commercial  policy could gain access for American  goods to 
Japanese markets, that would not just enlarge U.S. exports. It would 
also shrink  Japanese  business savings. And if U.S. investment policy 
could bring the apparatus  of credit cards and discount retailing to 
Japanese consumers, the Japanese household saving rate might fall 
sharply. 
In the second place, there  are special  problems  with high-technology 
industries.  In those industries,  marginal  costs of production  are vastly 
lower than average costs of production, which include, among other 
outlays, R&D on failed projects and capital expenditures  on quickly 
outmoded  equipment.  When one firm  gets a march  on another,  it need 
only price at a significant  discount  to that  other  firm's  average  costs, yet 
well above its own marginal  cost, to achieve a "strategic"  victory. This 
is the sort of businessman's game that goes on all the time within a 
nation.  By successfully  playing  such  games, one firm  can  gain  a decisive 
lead over its rivals. 
13. See Economic  Report  of the  President,  1987,  table 1-5. 
14. In fact, one can discern  elements  of this policy in the recent  rhetoric  and actions 
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The  public  policy  problem  arises  when  one nation's  firms  are  generally 
better at the strategic  game than another nation's firms-especially  if 
the  first  nation's  superiority  is predicated  on closed home  markets.  When 
that happens,  how will the second nation's firms  finance  the R&D and 
capital equipment  necessary to commercialize  the next generation  of 
products?  One answer  is to close markets  at home. The better  answer  is 
to open  markets  abroad  and  to whittle  away  at the home-court  advantage 
of foreign  rivals. 
Of course, opening  markets  is what  GATT  is all about.  The imbalance 
of savings on a world scale and the high-technology  dimension  simply 
give new urgency  to old concerns. 
In  the early  GATT  rounds,  much  protection  was removed  by a mutual 
exchange of concessions among  industrial  nations. The first six GATT 
rounds can, in fact, be seen as the exchange of carrots  for carrots. By 
the Tokyo Round,  however, the atmosphere  had  changed.  Negotiations 
involved a combination  of sticks and carrots. And, since the Tokyo 
Round, much trade  policy has been dominated  by the mutual  threat  of 
sticks. This  is the regrettable  but  probably  inevitable  outcome  of a world 
economy cowed by central  bank austerity  and of the unwillingness  of 
the new economic leaders-Germany and Japan-to  make unilateral 
trade  concessions for the sake of the international  system. 
In this atmosphere, it is ,not surprising  that Congressman  Richard 
Gephardt  (D.-Mo.) has gathered  considerable  support  for his version of 
results-oriented  trade  reciprocity.  Few Americans  trust  that  enlightened 
Japanese  self-interest  will liberalize  Japanese  markets,  and few Ameri- 
cans believe that the free flow of capital and know-how will ensure a 
congruence of economic well-being between the United States and 
Japan. All in all, the United States will be lucky if this episode of 
neomercantilism  ends with no worse than  the Gephardt  amendment. 
General  Discussion 
William  Poole suggested  that policy should  focus on the U.S. saving 
rate rather  than the trade deficit. He reasoned that reductions in the 
trade  deficit not accompanied  by an increase in national  saving would 
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investment  would have to fall. In Poole's judgment, policy should be 
directed  toward  reducing  the budget  deficit  and changing  incentives for 
private saving. With the emphasis instead on the trade deficit, U.S. 
monetary  policy has focused on depreciating  the dollar,  while, abroad, 
monetary  expansion  has accelerated  to limit the dollar's  decline. Poole 
argued that this combination of policies would accelerate inflation. 
Christopher  Sims saw the resistance of the monetary authorities to 
competitive  depreciation  to be based on  just such inflation  fears. But he 
noted that alternative  means of improving  the trade  balance might not 
be any better  for inflation. 
Richard  Cooper  argued  that  a further  devaluation  of the dollar  would 
risk seriously depressing  world economic activity over the next twelve 
to eighteen months. Investment  demands,  he noted, are already  fragile 
in many  major  industrial  nations. As those nations  lose export markets, 
downward accelerators may depress their economies further. Such 
weakness, in turn, could reduce the exports of the debt-ridden  LDCs. 
Although  stimulating  domestic  demand  in Europe  and  Japan  could  offset 
their  loss of exports and  minimize  these risks, the needed  expansionary 
policies are not yet in place. Some have argued  that  a willingness  on the 
part of the United States to depreciate  the dollar further  might move 
other nations to adopt the needed expansionary  policies. But Cooper 
contended  that the Germans,  and perhaps  the Japanese  as well, would 
not respond  prospectively  but only to an actual  crisis, which is what the 
United States should  be trying  to avoid. He concluded  that the risks in 
trying to  force cooperative behavior through the threat of further 
competitive  depreciation  are too great  at this time. 
James  Tobin  wondered  if  Dornbusch  had  a strong  case for  depreciation 
rather  than  a uniform  tariff  as a way to bring  down the U.S. trade  deficit. 
Tobin  viewed both the fact that a revenue tariff  would not affect capital 
account  transactions  and  the fact that  it would reduce  the budget  deficit 
as points in its favor. Sims commented that one can make a case for 
policy intervention  to affect exchange  rates  without  believing  that  asset 
market  participants  have poor foresight  or that  government  officials  can 
forecast better than the market.  For example, there may be a political 
decision to be made concerning  distribution  between young and old or 
current  and  future  generations. 
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protectionism would be relatively small. If other countries did not 
retaliate  when the United States imposed tariffs, optimal  tariff theory 
suggests  that  the imposition  of the tariffs  could actually  make  the United 
States  better  off. Even if other  countries  did  retaliate,  so that  the United 
States ended up with 10  percent  tariffs  at all borders,  the welfare  losses 
involved would be only on the order of 0.2 percent of GNP, about $8 
billion,  for  the United  States. In Krugman's  view, economists'  vehement 
opposition  to trade  protection  exaggerates  its costs and  must  be  justified 
on other grounds. One might argue that free trade is an important 
component  of the Western  alliance;  if the alliance  cannot cooperate  on 
trade, trust in its ability  to cooperate on other matters  may be eroded. 
In addition,  there is legitimate  concern that protectionism  will take the 
form  of cartelization,  which  could  impose much  larger  costs than  tariffs. 
Cooper  argued  that  increased  protection  by the United States endan- 
gers the world's liberal trading system even though today's climate 
differs  from that of the early 1930s.  As Mann  points out, at the time of 
the Smoot-Hawley  tariffs,  the United  States  had  been warned  in advance 
that the imposition  of tariffs  would be met with retaliation.  Today, the 
countries of  Europe and elsewhere are themselves on the edge of 
protecting  various  industries  for  domestic  political  reasons.  If the United 
States were to raise its barriers,  the political consensus abroad  would 
push those countries  over the edge. 
Cooper also observed that the game-theoretic  benefits of "getting 
tougher"  were difficult  for the United States  to realize. A threat  must  be 
credible  to be useful. But  in the U.S. political  system, a threat  is credible 
only after a strong  public constituency  has been mobilized  in its favor. 
However, once that happens, it becomes not just a threat  that can be 
withdrawn  in response to appropriate  behavior abroad, but rather a 
policy with  public  support  that  is hard  to reverse. 
William  Cline  questioned  Crandall's  conclusion  that  protection  in the 
auto industry had very different effects from protection in steel. He 
pointed  to Crandall's  data showing  that the steel import  share  declined 
3 percentage  points between 1984  and 1986  after rising 10 percentage 
points from 1980 to 1984. He also questioned whether the scope for 
geographical  diversification  in steel eliminated  the protective effect of 
the arrangement,  noting  that the United States promptly  forced export 
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agreement.  Cooper noted that Crandall's  estimates may overstate the 
effects of voluntary  restraint  agreements  on the prices  of Japanese  autos 
sold in the United States, insofar as he assumes that in their absence 
prices would have moved with the yen-dollar  exchange rate. In fact, 
work  by Mann  has shown that prices of goods not subject  to voluntary 
restraint  agreements  do not track  exchange  rates  well either.  To identify 
convincingly  the effects of those agreements,  one must take account of 
normal markup  practices in response to the exchange rate, Cooper 
concluded. 